By Olli J. Heinonen
Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
According to Agence France Press, on Oct. 4 Iran’s President Ahmadinejad stated, “If they give us the 20 percent (enriched) fuel, we will immediately halt 20 percent (enrichment).” He also said that “Production of 20 percent (enriched) fuel is not economical. It is expensive and there is no (export) market that would to justify continuing to operate the plant,” he added in his national address. He added, however, that “we need fuel to 3.5 percent for our plants and research.”
The key factor of President Ahmadinejad’s speech is not really about 20% enrichment per se, but an acknowledgement that such enrichment production is not economical.
So let’s take that message a little deeper.
After the Cold War, tens of tons of highly enriched uranium remain from military programs, and when blended down, is available for civilian uses. This is an another reason for Iran why there is no technical or economical necessity to produce additional 20% uranium for its research reactors.
President Ahmadinejad, however, states that Iran still needs fuel for its nuclear power plants. In the foreseeable future, Iran’s uranium needs are secure: Bushehr has a long-term contract for fuel supplies, there is a well functioning nuclear fuel market, and Russia along with the IAEA (which is in the process) established last resort nuclear fuel banks. On all accounts, Iran’s power reactor fuel needs are well covered.
This leads then to Natanz, Iran’s fuel-enrichment plant, and its current spinning 8,000 IR-1 centrifuges and centrifuge research and development. The Iranian IR-1 centrifuge program is in trouble: its current performance is well below 1 kg SWU/year, which is less than half what is the design value of such centrifuges. Producing low enriched uranium with those 8,000 IR-1 centrifuges is economically equally unjustified, as with the production of 20% enriched uranium. The production of 3.5% enriched fuel should therefore logically stop, and Iran, if it really does not want to remove enrichment from its equation, could focus on R&D for uranium enrichment, given that its current IR-2s and IR-4s use 1980’s technologies.
If Mr. Ahmadinejad’s comment on not needing 20% enriched uranium and its implications could be understood as described above, it could start unraveling the Gordian knot, and begin the step towards ensuring that the Iranian program will follow a peaceful track.
Before joining the Belfer Center as a senior fellow in August 2010, Olli Heinonen served for 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, including five years as Deputy Director General, and head of the Department of Safeguards.
